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Abstract
A collectivised fund is a proposed form of pension investment, in
which all investors agree that any funds associated with deceased mem-
bers should be split among survivors. For this to be a viable financial
product, it is necessary to know how to manage the fund even when it is
heterogeneous: that is when different investors have different preferences,
wealth and mortality. There is no obvious way to define a single objective
for a heterogeneous fund, so this is not an optimal control problem. In
lieu of an objective function, we take an axiomatic approach. Subject to
our axioms on the management of the fund, we find an upper bound on
the utility that can be achieved for each investor, assuming a complete
markets and the absence of systematic longevity risk. We give a strat-
egy for the management of such heterogeneous funds which achieves this
bound asymptotically as the number of investors tends to infinity.
Introduction
We study the problem of maximizing the benefit one can obtain from one’s
pension if one is willing to pursue a collective strategy. This is a strategy in
which a group of individuals agree that all assets left by an individual who dies
are shared among the survivors.
By collectivising investments one counters idiosyncratic longevity risk. Un-
like an annuity which guarantees a fixed real-terms income until retirement, a
collectivised fund may pursue a risky strategy to take advantage of the equity
risk-premium and so yield a higher utility for investors. Additionally, a fund
may also exploit intertemporal substitution of consumption, by delaying con-
sumption until investments have grown. These considerations imply that a col-
lectivised fund should out-perform both an annuity and a individually managed
pension funder. For a more detailed discussion of the benefits of collectivised
pension investment, see [4].
We will model a collective fund of n individuals who have already retired and
invested their capital in the fund. We will then consider the optimal pattern of
investment and consumption.
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For simplicity we assume that the only stochastic risk factors are given by
the market and idiosyncratic mortality risk. Our modelling for the market,
mortality and individual preferences is described in detail in 1. We will also
give a number of remarks on how systematic longevity risk could be included in
the analysis.
In Section 2 we give a mathematical description of the optimal investment
problem for a homogeneous fund: that is to say, a collective fund where all the
individuals are isomorphic. We also show that an overall objective function for
the fund can be derived using the ideas of robust optimization or the notion
of “The Veil of Ignorance” introduced in [17]. Both approaches yield the same
objective function. The management of the fund may then be written as an
optimal control problem. We state the optimal control problems for both the
cases of continuous and discrete time consumption. We do not solve these
problem in this paper. The discrete time problem is solved analytically in the
case of homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences in the Black–Scholes model in [3]
building on the techniques of [16, 10]. A numerical algorithm for exponential
Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences is given in [2].
In Section 3 we prove some basic properties of collectivised pension invest-
ment. Specifically we prove that, under very mild assumptions, collectivisation
is always beneficial. We also give a sufficient condition for constant consump-
tion to be the optimal strategy. These conditions are extremely stringent and
indicate that an annuity will typically be a suboptimal investment.
The mathematical novelty in the paper appears in Section 4 where we con-
sider how to manage heterogeneous funds. These are funds where preferences,
capital and mortality distributions vary between investors. This problem is chal-
lenging because it is not obvious how to combine each individual’s preferences
to obtain a single objective for the fund as a whole. Rather than attempt this,
we take an axiomatic approach describing the properties that any management
strategy for the fund should possess. From these axioms we are able to deduce
an upper bound on the utility of each investor in a heterogeneous fund, on the
assumption that the market is complete. Given the times-scale of pension in-
vestments this assumption is a very reasonable approximation to reality. We
are then able to describe a strategy that asymptotically achieves this bound as
the number of investors tends to infinity.
1 Market, preference and mortality models
1.1 Market model
We will assume that a fund may invest in a market determined by a filtered
probability space (ΩM ,F ,FM
t∈R+ ,P
M ). In particular we will only consider con-
tinuous time markets.
We assume there are k available assets and that the price of asset j at time t
in real terms is given by Sjt . Arbitrary quantities of assets can be bought or sold
at these prices. We assume that the asset 1 is risk free, so that dS1t = rtS
1
t dt
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where rt is the short-rate. We assume as our no-arbitrage condition that there
there is an equivalent measure QM such that (S0t )
−1Sit is a Q-Martingale for
each i. We will call such a market an infinitely-liquid market.
1.2 Mortality model
We will later assume that consumption only occurs at times in a set T which may
be either [0, T ) or the evenly spaced time grid {0, δt, 2δt, 3δt, . . . , T −δt} where
T is an upper bound on an individual’s possible age which may be infinite. As
a result we may assume that mortality events are also restricted to T . We write
dT (t) for the measure determined by the index set: this will be the Lebesgue
measure on [0,∞) in the continuous case, or the sum of Dirac masses of mass
δt at each point in T for the discrete case.
We assume that the random variables τi representing the time of death of
individual i are independent and absolutely continuous with respect to dT (t),
with distribution given by pit dT (t). We will write (Ω
L,FL,FLt ,P
L) for the
filtered probability space generated by all the τi, the filtration is obtained by
requiring that each τi is a stopping time. We will write Fτ (t) for the distribution
function of τ .
The assumption of independence means that we are only considering idiosyn-
cratic longevity risk, but we will give some remarks on how systematic longevity
risk will affect our findings later in the paper.
We will write nt for the number of survivors at time t, that is the number of
individuals whose time of death is greater than or equal to t. This convention
ensures that n0 = n and works well with our convention that cashflows received
at the time of death are still consumed. Note, however, that nt+δt will be FLt
measurable.
1.3 Preference model
We assume that there are n individuals. We model a “pension outcome” for
individual i as a pair (γi, τi) consisting of a stochastic process γ
i
t , representing
the rate of pension payments to individual i at time t, and the random variable
τi representing the time of death. The underlying filtered probability space will
be denoted by (Ω,F ,Ft,P) and is assumed to satisfy the usual conditions. The
units of γt should be taken to be in real terms which ensures that our models
for inflation and preferences are separate.
We will later assume that consumption only occurs at times in a set T . It
will occasionally be convenient to allow the cashflow γt to be non-zero when
t > τ , but this cash will not be consumed. In the discrete case we assume that
cashflow at the moment of death γτ is still consumed. So the total consumption
over the lifetime of an individual is∫ τ
0
γt dT (t).
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We will assume that the preferences of our individuals are given by a R ∪
{±∞} valued gain function Ji(γ, τi) which acts on pension outcomes. The
individual prefers pension outcomes which yield higher values of the gain func-
tion. We will assume that the gain function takes the value −∞ whenever
P (γt1t≤τ (t) < 0) > 0. Following [4] we make the following definitions.
Definition 1.1. The preferences are said to be invariant if they are invariant
under filtration preserving automorphisms of the probability space.
Definition 1.2. We will say that Ji is concave if it is concave as a function of
γ for all τi.
Definition 1.3. The preferences are monotonic if Ji(γ, τ) ≤ Ji(γ′, τ) if γt ≤ γ′t
for all t ∈ T .
Definition 1.4. A gain function does not saturate if whenever J (γ, τ) is finite
we have J(γ + ǫ, τ) > J (γ, τ) for all positive ǫ.
Example 1.5. Von Neumann–Morgernstern preferences with mortality are de-
termined by a choice of concave, increasing utility function u : R≥0 → R and a
discount rate b. The gain function is given by
J (γ, τ) = E
(∫ τ
0
e−btu(γt) dT (t)
)
.
Example 1.6. Exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences with mortality are
determined by a choice of concave, increasing utility function u : R≥0 → R. The
gain function is given by
J (γ, τ) = E
(
− exp
(
−
∫ τ
0
u(γt) dT (t)
))
.
Both of these gain functions give rise to concave, invariant, monotonic pref-
erences. As is explained in detail in [4], these gain functions are also stationary
(meaning that the preferences do not depend upon the time period being con-
sidered) and law-invariant (meaning that the preferences depend only on the
probability law of the consumption and not the time at which information is
received).
A larger class of stationary preferences over consumption may be obtained if
one drops the requirement that preferences are law-invariant. Such preferences
were studied in discrete time by Kreps and Porteus, [15], and the particular
case of Epstein–Zin preferences, introduced in [13], has proved popular in appli-
cations as they allow for separate risk-aversion and intertemporal substitution
parameters while maintaining mathematical tractability. Such preferences have
been used to resolve a number of asset pricing puzzles, see for example [7, 6, 8, 9].
In [18], a continuous time analogue of Epstein–Zin preferences is defined us-
ing BSDEs on probability spaces equipped with a filtration generated by Brown-
ian motion, building on the continuous time analogues of Kreps–Porteus prefer-
ences introduced in [11]. A detailed literature review of the development of such
preferences is given in [18]. Motivated by [18] we may define continuous-time
Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality as follows.
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Example 1.7. Suppose we are working with continuous time mortality. Suppose
that Ω = ΩM × ΩL and that the filtered probability space ΩM is generated by
d-dimensional Brownian motion. Let N it = 1τ i≤t be the jump process associated
with the death of individual i. Let Λit be the predictable compensator of N
i
t given
by
Λit =
∫ t∧τ i
0
λs ds. (1.1)
where λt is the force of mortality. Let M
i
t be the compensated martingale process
defined by M it = N
i
t − Λ
i
t.
Let S2 denote the set of R valued progressively measurable processes {Yt}
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) such that
‖Y ‖2S2 := E[sup
t≥0
|Yt∧T |
2] <∞.
Let L2(W ) denote the set of Rd valued progressively measurable processes Zt
(0 ≤ t ≤ T ) such that
‖Z‖2L2(W ) := E[
∫ ∞
0
‖Zt‖
2dt] <∞.
Let L2(λ) denote the set of Rn valued progressively measurable processes ζt (0 ≤
t ≤ T ) such that
‖ζ‖2L2(λ) := E[
n∑
i=1
∫ t∧τ i
0
|ζis|
2λs ds] <∞.
Let b > 0 be a discount rate. Let 0 6= ρ < 1 and 0 6= α < 1 be parameters
determining the individual’s satiation and risk preferences. The Epstein–Zin
aggregator f : [0,∞)× (−∞, 0]→ R is defined by
f(γ, v) := b
αv
ρ
((
γ
(αv)
1
α
)ρ
− 1
)
.
We will assume further that α < 0 and 0 < ρ < 1. These parameter restrictions
are justified in [18] 1 on the grounds of empirical relevance. We require one
additional parameter a > 0 which we call the adequacy level.
A stopping time τ is admissible if τ < T almost surely. Given an admissible
stopping time τ , the set of admissible consumption streams is defined by
C := {γ ∈ R+ | E[
∫ τ
0
e−bsγs ds] <∞}
where R+ is the set of all non-negative progressively measurable processes. Given
an admissible consumption and mortality (γt, τ) we define (Vt, Zt, ζt) to be the
1 [18] uses a slightly different parameterization. Their parameters δ, γ and ψ are related
to ours by δ = b, γ = 1− α and ψ = 1
1−ρ
.
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solution of the BSDE
dVt = f(γt, Vt)1t≤τ dt− Zt dWt −
n∑
i=1
ζit dM
i
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; VT = U (1.2)
where (V, Z, ζ) ∈ S2 × L2(W )× L2(λ˜) and where we set U =
aα
α
. The existence
and uniqueness of solutions of the BSDE (1.2) may be established using the
technique of the proof of Proposition 2.2 of [18] combined with the properties
of BSDEs with default jumps established in [12]. Since we assume that τ is
bounded above by T , the techniques of [5] are not required.
We may then define the Epstein–Zin utility with mortality for adequacy level
a associated with (γ, τ) by
J (γ, τ) := V0.
In the classical Epstein–Zin utility without mortality, the term U in (1.2) is a
Fτ -measurable random variable given by a U =
cατ
α
where cτ denotes a bequest
at time τ . Such a formulation is attractive mathematically as it ensures the
preferences are positively homogeneous. This symmetry then allows one to
reduce the dimension of control problems involving such preferences.
However, we note that when α < 0, this modelling choice would associate
an infinitely negative utility to dying without a bequest. No amount of lifetime
consumption would be sufficient to overcome this. This does not seem a plausible
model for typical pension preferences.
In our model, we call a an adequacy level because the outcome (γ, τ) has
the same utility as (γ˜, T ) where γ˜ is equal to γ up to time τ and equal to a
thereafter (this is because f(a, U) = 0). Thus an investor is indifferent to dying
or living at the adequacy level. The importance of the adequacy level in pension
modelling is studied in [4].
The techniques of [18] allow one to prove that Epstein–Zin preferences with
mortality are concave and monotone.
Lemma 1.8. Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality are invariant.
Proof. Let φ : Ω → Ω be a filtration automorphism. Let (V, Z, ζ) ∈ S2 ×
L2(W )× L2(λ˜) be the solution to 1.2. Then we have
d(V ◦φ)t = f((γ ◦φ)t, (V ◦φ)t)1t≤τ dt−(Z ◦φ)td(W ◦φ)t−
n∑
i=1
(ζ ◦φ)it d(M
i ◦φ)t
for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T and VT ◦ φ = U . By the martingale representation theorem
for processes with default jumps (see e.g. [14]) we may find Z˜t ∈ L2(W ) and
ζ˜ ∈ L2(λ˜) such that
d(V ◦ φ)t = f((γ ◦ φ)t, (V ◦ φ)t)1t≤τ dt− Z˜tdWt −
n∑
i=1
ζ˜it dM
i
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Hence the Epstein–Zin utility with mortality for γ ◦ φ is equal to (V ◦ φ)0 = V0
(the last equality follows since F0 = {∅,Ω} and so V (ω)0 is independent of
ω).
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2 Managing homogeneous funds
In this section we consider how to manage homogeneous funds. We call a fund
homogeneous if all individuals in the fund have identical preferences, wealth and
mortality. We will consider the management of heterogeneous funds in 4.
Since we assume that each individual has an identical mortality distribution
we may define pt := p
i
t.
Let us first consider the case of finite n.
We wish to decide how to manage a collective pension fund where individual
contributes an amount X0 at time 0. Individual i will receive an income γ
i
t at
time t, with γit = 0 if the individual is dead at that time. Any cash that is yet to
be consumed is invested in the market. There is no bequest when an individual
dies, all remaining cash is shared with the fund.
We need to choose an objective for the fund itself. We informally outline
two proposals which we will then explain in more detail.
(i) Suppose that the individual gain function is law-invariant and so depends
only on the distribution of outcomes. We may understand “distribution”
to mean distribution in both probability and distribution across the pop-
ulation. In this way the individual gain function gives rise to an objective
for the entire fund. We will call this the “distribution approach”.
(ii) We follow the robust optimization approach to managing the fund: we
maximize the infimum of the individual gain functions.
Let us explain the mathematical detail required for the distribution ap-
proach. We suppose that the individual gain function is law-invariant. We
define a discrete uniformly distributed random variable ι which takes values in
{1, . . . , n}. We write (Ωι, σι,Pι) for the probability space generated by ι. We
define a filtration F ι
t∈R+∪{∞} by
F ιt =
{
{Ωι, ∅} t <∞
σι t =∞.
Thus Ωι represents a random choice of individual made at time ∞. If we have a
law-invariant individual gain function Jι defined relative to a probability space
Ω, we can then define a gain function relative to Ω× Ωι by requiring
JD(γ) = Jι(γ
ι, τι). (2.1)
Note that since τι is not a stopping time, this gain function can only be given
a meaning for law-invariant individual gain functions Jι.
The gain function for the robust approach is given by
J R(γ) := inf
i∈I0
Ji(γ
i, τi). (2.2)
7
These two approaches are not equivalent in general. Consider the Biblical
problem faced by Solomon of distributing a child among two women who claim
to be its mother. In the distribution approach, giving the child to a randomly
selected woman would be optimal. In the robust approach, giving neither woman
the child would be an equally optimal alternative. For concave individual gain
functions, Solomon’s recommended approach of splitting the child in two would
be ideal.
Having decided on a gain function J for our fund, we can write down the
associated optimization problem.
We may also augment our probability space with a filtered probability space
Ω⊥ so that any arbitrary decisions that need to be made (such as choosing a
random woman to give the child) can be made using random variables defined
on this space. We then take Ω = ΩM ×ΩL×Ωι×Ω⊥ equipped with the product
filtration Ft and product measure P. As one might expect, under reasonable
conditions, Ω⊥ proves to be irrelevant, and the optimal strategies can be taken
to be ΩM×ΩL×Ωι measurable. See Remark 3.5 below. Note that when working
with Epstein–Zin preferences we will always assume Ω⊥ is trivial to ensure that
the preferences are defined.
We then wish to choose progressively measurable consumption streams γit ≥
0 with t ∈ T and investment proportions αjt in asset j with t ∈ R
+. We require∑k
j=1 α
j
t ≤ 1. We have an inequality in this equation, because it is acceptable,
if sub-optimal, to simply discard assets. We must choose these processes such
that the total wealth of the fund is always non-negative. We write A for the
resulting set of admissible controls (γ,α), and we will now give a fully precise
mathematical description of this set.
First let us write down the dynamics of the fund value. For continuous time
consumption the fund value satisfies the SDE
dFt =
k∑
i=1
αisFsdS
i
s −
n∑
i=1
γit dt (2.3)
with F0 =
∑n
i=1Bi, where Bi is the initial budget of individual i (in this section
we are assuming that all individuals have identical initial budget Bi = X0, but
the equations for the more general case will be useful later). For discrete time
consumption, let Ft denote the fund value before consumption and F t denote
the fund value after consumption. We then have the following budget equations
for the dynamics of Ft and F t.
Ft =


∑n
i=1 Bi t = 0
limh→0+ F t−h t ∈ T \ {0}
F t otherwise.
F t =
{
Ft −
∑n
i=1 γ
i
t
F t′ +
∑k
i=1
∫ t
t′
αisF s dS
i
s t
′ ∈ T and t′ ≤ t < t′ + δt.
(2.4)
A strategy is (γ,α) is admissible if it ensures Ft ≥ 0 and F t ≥ 0 at all times.
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Hence
A = {(γ,α) ∈ PM | Ft ≥ 0 and F t ≥ 0, ∀t} (2.5)
where PM is the set of progressively measurable Rn × Rk valued processes for
the probability space Ω.
Our objective is to compute
vn = sup
(γ,α)∈A
J (γ). (2.6)
and to find (γ,α) achieving this supremum.
We will henceforth assume that our individual gain functions are concave.
Since the market is positively homogeneous, given a strategy (γ,α) we may form
a new strategy (γ¯,α) which assigns the mean consumption to all survivors:
γ¯it =
{
0 τi < t
1
nt
∑n
j=1 γ
j
t otherwise.
The concavity of our individual gain functions ensures that for our fund’s gain
function we have
J (γ¯i, α) ≥ J (γi, α).
So we may assume without loss of generality that all survivors consume the
same amount γt at time t. Under this assumption we have that JD = JR,
so the distinction between the distributional approach and the robust approach
will not in fact be important.
Our motivation for introducing the two approaches is that we believe the
distributional approach corresponds more closely to the intuitive notion of op-
timal investment for a collective fund, however the robust approach is required
if we wish to use Epstein–Zin utility as the individual gain function. To justify
our claim that the distributional approach is more intuitive we first note the
example of Solomon above. A second justification is given by the concept of the
“Veil of Ignorance” described in [17]. This concept suggests that when making
collective decisions one should make those decisions as though the identity of
the individuals was unknown. Our filtered probability space Ωι represents this
veil of ignorance: the veil being lifted at time∞, but the control (γ, α) is chosen
in a state of ignorance.
Having decided that the consumption, γt, should be the same for all indi-
viduals, we may now consider how to model infinite collectives (n =∞). When
performing accounting calculations in this case, we will perform all calculations
on a per-individual basis. For example, rather than keep track of the total fund
value which would be infinite, we keep track of the fund value per individual
which will be finite. We will assume that a deterministic proportion of the orig-
inal individuals dies over each time interval given by the integral of pt dT (t)
over that interval. This assumption allows us to include mortality within our
accounting.
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Let us express this precisely. Let Yt represent the fund value per individual
at time t before consumption or mortality, and let Y t represent the fund value
per individual after consumption. Then in the continuous time case we have
dYt =
k∑
i=1
αisYsdS
i
s − πtγt dt (2.7)
where πt is the proportion of individuals surviving to time t. In the discrete
time case we have
Yt =


X0 t = 0
limh→0+ Y t−h t ∈ T \ {0}
Y t otherwise.
Y t =
{
Yt − πtγt t ∈ T
Y t′ +
∑k
i=1
∫ t
t′
αisY s dS
i
s t
′ ∈ T and t′ ≤ t < t′ + δt.
(2.8)
For the case n = ∞, equations (2.7) and (2.8) define the process Yt. In the
case n =∞, πt = 1− Fτ (t) is deterministic. For the case of finite n, equations
(2.7) and (2.8) follow from (2.3) and (2.4). In the case of finite n, πt =
nt
n
is a
random variable.
In the case n =∞ we take as the gain function for our fund
J (γ) := J1(γ, τ1). (2.9)
This is reasonable since we have assumed that all living individuals receive the
same consumption stream γt and have isomorphic preferences. Alternatively if
the individual gain function is law-invariant we may define a random variable τι
which is measurable only at ∞ and which has distribution ptdt. We may then
write the gain function as
J (γ) := Jι(γ, τι). (2.10)
These two formulations will be equivalent, but (2.10) seems a more intuitive
formulation.
We define the set A of admissible strategies in the case n = ∞ by saying
that a strategy is admissible if Yt ≥ 0 for all time. We may now define v∞ via
equation (2.6) as before.
We note that our approach to treating of the case n =∞ is at present rather
heuristic, but it will be justified rigorously via limiting arguments in the next
section.
3 Basic properties of collectivised investment
3.1 Collectivisation is beneficial
It is intuitively clear that collectivisation should be beneficial. We give a formal
proof within our model.
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The probability spaces we have defined depend upon the number of individu-
als, n, but if n < m there is an obvious way to map random variables defined on
the probability space for n individuals to random variables defined on the prob-
ability space for m individuals that preserves the random variables defining the
market and the mortality of the first n individuals. We shall assume henceforth
that the individual gain functions are preserved under this mapping. This will
happen automatically if we define our gain functions using a specification such
as Epstein–Zin preferences with mortality with parameter values (α, ρ, b, a).
Theorem 3.1. If the individual gain functions Ji are concave then
vn ≤ vm if n ≤ m <∞.
Moreover vn ≤ v∞ in complete markets. In place of assuming that the market
is complete, one may instead require that admissible strategies are integrable.
Proof. We recall that, by assumption, the individual gain functions Ji are in-
variant and isomorphic. We note that to each permutation of the individuals
we can associate an automorphism of the probability space which permutes the
individuals. Hence a strategy which is effective for one set of n individuals will
give rise to an isomorphic strategy for another set of n individuals.
Suppose thatm is finite. Suppose we set up
(
m
n
)
funds corresponding to each
possible choice of n individuals from the full set of m individuals and allocate
the initial budget equally to each of these funds. Given an admissible strategy
which achieves a value v for the gain function for the first n individuals, we can
use it in each of these
(
m
n
)
funds. By the concavity of the gain function, we see
that the resulting strategy will have a value greater than or equal to v. The
result follows.
Now consider the case whenm =∞. Let (γ,α) be an admissible strategy for
a collective of n investors. Our budget constraint together with the requirement
that the discounted asset prices are Q-measure martingales ensures that
EQ×PL
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫
γit
S1t
dT (t)
)
≤ X0.
Note that γit is non-negative. Hence by Fubini’s theorem we may define a
stochastic process γt by
γt
S1t
:= EPL
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
∫
γit
S1t
dT (t) | St
)
≤ X0.
where St is the vector of asset prices at time t. This will be progressively
measurable with respect to the filtered probability space of the market (ΩM )
and moreover will satisfy
EQ
(∫
γt
S1t
dT (t)
)
≤ X0.
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It follows from our assumption that the market is complete that we can then find
α which ensures that (γ,α) is an admissible strategy for an infinite collective.
The concavity of the gain function now ensures that
Ji(γ
i, τi) ≤ Jι(γ, τι).
Hence v∞ ≥ vn.
If the market is not complete, we instead use the integrability of α in order
to define α by averaging.
To prove that vn → v∞ as n → ∞ we require a little more than concavity
and invariance, one also needs some degree of continuity in the gain function
when it is perturbed by a low probability event. As an example we prove the
following in Appendix A.
Theorem 3.2. If preferences are given by Epstein–Zin preferences with mor-
tality with 0 < ρ < 1 and α < 0 then vn → v∞ as n→∞.
See [2] for the case of exponential utility.
Remark 3.3. The proof of Theorem 3.1 will continue to work if one introduces
systematic longevity risk. The main challenge in extending 3.2 lies in defining
the utility function in a richer probability space. Nevertheless, the continuity
required to establish 3.2 can be expected for any gain function that yields a well-
posed optimization problem.
3.2 When is constant consumption optimal?
Defined benefit pensions and annuities typically aim to provide constant con-
sumption stream in real terms. It is therefore natural to ask when constant
consumption is optimal. Our next result gives sufficient conditions. We assume
for technical reasons that the asset price processes Sit are all given by diffu-
sion processes. We will call a market that satisfies this assumption a diffusion
market.
Theorem 3.4. Constant consumption is optimal for von Neumann–Morgernstern
preferences with b = 0 in complete diffusion markets with P = Q and rt = 0
when n = ∞. If pt = 0 for all times except T − δt then constant consumption
is optimal for all n. For example, in a Black–Scholes–Merton market with no
drift and risk free rate of zero one has P = Q.
Proof. We will give our proof using symmetry arguments rather than direct
calculation. Our aim in using this approach is to explain why this result feels
“obvious”.
First consider the case n =∞.
By the classification of standard probability spaces, the filtered probability
space (Ω,Ft∈T ,P) is isomorphic to the Cartesian product (S
1)T where S1 is the
circle of circumference 1. Note that we are using the assumption that we are
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in a diffusion market to ensure that these probability spaces are standard and
atomless. Thus rotations of the circles give rise to market isomorphisms (see [1]
for a definition of market isomorphism). This gives an action of the Lie group
(S1)T on our market and hence on the space of admissible investment strategies.
Given any strategy we may apply these rotations to obtain new, equivalent
strategies. Choose an invariant metric on our Lie group, so that we may define
the average strategy. Note that we are using market completeness here, just
as we did in the proof of Theorem 3.1, to ensure that the average strategy
exists. By the concavity of our maximization problem and Jensen’s inequality,
this averaged strategy will outperform the original strategy. But the averaged
strategy will be invariant under the group action and hence deterministic.
Since we may assume our strategy is deterministic, it will be a pure bond
investment so Yt+δt = Y˜t. From our dynamics (2.8) we have
Yt+δt = Yt − (1− Fτ (t))γt
Solving this difference equation yields the (intuitively obvious) budget constraint
0 ≤ X0 =
∫ T
0
(1 − Fτ (t))γt dT (t). (3.1)
Where Fτ is the distribution function of τ . The expected utility is∫ T
0
(1− Fτ (t))u(γt) dT (t).
The result for n = ∞ is now easy to prove by brute force, but we wish to use
symmetry.
Given a measurable space with non-negative, standard measure µ we can
consider the more general problem
maximize
γ∈L1(µ)
∫
u(γ)µ
subject to γ ≥ 0
and
∫
γ µ = X0
(3.2)
The optimization we wish to solve is just the special case with µ = (1 −
Fτ (t)) dT (t). If µ is isomorphic to an invariant measure m on the circle S1,
we can use the rotation argument above to prove that the optimizer is given by
constant γ∗, specifically γ∗ = X0∫
µ
.
For more general µ, suppose we are given a function γ which satisfies the
constraints. We let γ × 1 be the function on the space with product measure
µ × λ where λ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. But µ × λ is an atomless,
positive probability measure so is isomorphic to an invariant measure m on the
circle. Hence γ × 1 is outperformed by the constant function γ∗ on µ× λ. This
can be projected to a constant function γ∗ on µ. Since the objective functions
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on µ× λ and µ are equal for functions which are constant on the λ factor, this
means that γ itself is outperformed by γ∗. Hence the constant function γ∗ is
optimal on µ itself.
In the case when pt = 0 for all times except T−δt, the optimization problems
for different values of n are all equivalent, so the result follows.
This result provides a mathematical explanation for the intuitive appeal of
annuities and defined benefit pensions. However, there is the obvious caveat
that the assumptions are extremely strong. One expects that with any slight
weakening of these assumptions, constant cashflows will no longer be optimal.
We prove such a converse in the case of Epstein–Zin preferences in the paper
[3].
One interpretation of this result that is worth noting is that it suggests
taking the discount rate b = 0 in our preferences will accord better with investor
expectations than choosing other values of b. This accords with the theoretical
discussion of discount rates in pension modelling in [4].
Remark 3.5. We note that the same averaging argument can be used to show
that the probability space Ω⊥ can be safely ignored in a complete market with
concave preferences.
4 Heterogeneous Funds
We now wish to consider how to manage consumption and investment when the
individuals are not identical.
For simplicity, let us assume that there are a finite number, ℓ, of possible
initial types of investor {ζ1, . . . , ζℓ}. We write Z for the set of types of investor.
Each type ζ describes the initial capital, mortality distribution and preferences
of the individual. Our argument will carry through with appropriate modifica-
tions to the case of a compact space of types rather than a finite set of types.
However, giving such an account would increase the technical burden to little
real purpose.
It is hypothetically appealing to identify the optimal investment strategy
for the heterogeneous fund. However, we would need to define optimality, and
this will require us to specify preferences over outcomes between different types
of investor. Describing such preferences seems challenging and the choice of
preferences would be controversial.
Instead we will take an axiomatic approach. Rather than find an optimal
scheme for managing a fund we merely seek an acceptable management scheme.
We will define the notion of acceptable axiomatically, and will show that for
large funds all acceptable management schemes yield similar outcomes for the
investors.
We assume that the preferences of an individual of type ζ are given by a
concave, invariant gain function Jζ(γ, τ). Let us write v(n, ζ) for the value
function for individuals of type ζ investing in this market in a collective of size
n as modelled in Section 2.
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We assume that
lim
n→∞
v(n, ζ) = v(∞, ζ).
Sufficient conditions to ensure this are described in the papers [2] and [3].
The initial population is determined by a vector ζ ∈ Zn, where component
i of ζ denotes the type of the i-th individual. A management scheme M is a
function acting on vectors ζ of arbitrary length n and which yields a strategy
(γ,α) where γt is a vector of consumptions of length n with i-th component
being the consumption of individual i, and α is an investment strategy. We
require that the combined consumption and investment are self-financing. Thus
M :
∞⊔
n=1
Zn →
∞⊔
n=1
L0(Rn × Rk).
and M maps the i-th component of the first union into the i-th component of
the second union.
Our first axiom forM is one of fairness, which as we have seen is a property
that arises automatically in any concave maximization problem.
Axiom I1. All surviving individuals of type ζ consume the same amount. That
is
(i) if M(ζ) = (γ,α) then γit = γ
j
t when ζ(i) = ζ(j), t ≤ τi and t ≤ τj .
(ii) If ζ′ is obtained by permuting the elements of ζ, then M(ζ′) is obtained
by the corresponding permutation of the consumption streams of M(ζ)
Let the proportions of different individuals prevailing in the population be
given by a vector of weights ω(ζ) = (ωζ1 , . . . , ωζℓ) with 0 < ωζ < 1, ωζ rational
and
∑
ζ∈Z ωζ = 1. Let lcm(ω) denote the lowest common multiple of the
denominators of the fractions ωi, so we know that the population is some integer
multiple of lcm(ω).
By Axiom I1 we may define
aM(ω, n, ζ)
to be the value of the gain function achieved by an individual of type ζ for a
population of size n. This is defined if n is any integer multiple of lcm(ω).
If aM(ω, n, ζ) < v(nωζ , ζ) then the investment strategy for the heteroge-
neous fund will not be able to attract investors of type ζ as they would be
better off following the strategy of Section 2. Theorem 3.1 then suggests that
this would be to the detriment of all other investors in the heterogeneous fund,
as increasing collectivisation should always be beneficial. These observations
motivate the following axioms.
Axiom I2. A management scheme is monotone if:
aM(ω,m, ζ) ≤ aM(ω, n, ζ)
if m ≤ n.
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Axiom I3. A management scheme achieves the performance standard if
aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ v(nωζ , ζ).
for all n and ζ.
Definition 4.1. A management scheme is acceptable if it satisfies Axioms I1,
I2 and I3.
By the monotonicity property, we may unambiguously define
aM(ω,∞, ζ) = lim
n→∞
aM(ω, n, ζ).
By the performance standard and our assumption on the convergence of v(n, ζ)
as n→∞ we see that for any acceptable management scheme
aM(ω,∞, ζ) ≥ v(∞, ζ). (4.1)
The scheme of simply grouping all individuals of a given type together into a
homogeneous fund and managing that according to the model of Section 2 will
yield an acceptable management scheme which achieves the lower bound (4.1).
We call this the basic management scheme.
We wish to show that the basic management scheme is asymptotically op-
timal in complete markets. The key observation is that collective investment
provides no substantive benefit for the investment problem in a complete market
without mortality.
Let us consider how to write a collective investment problem for n individ-
uals without mortality investing in our market. We choose consumption γit for
individual i, and overall investment proportions αt. The total fund value will be
given by the budget equations (2.4), and hence the set of admissible controls for
this problem will be given by (2.5). The difference will be that the preferences of
the individual will depend only upon cashflows received and not upon mortality,
so we will suppose that for individual i we have a gain function Jˆi(γit) which
depends only upon the cashflows. We define the value function
vˆi := sup
A1
Jˆi(γ
i
t)
whereAn is the set of acceptable admissible controls for n individuals. Although
we have defined the set of admissible controls for n individuals, we do not write
down an optimization problem for n individuals as we do not know what the
objective should be across a heterogeneous collective.
Our next result shows that in a complete market without mortality there
is no real benefit in considering collectivised problems as, however we select an
admissible control (by solving an optimization problem or otherwise), it will
never bring a substantive advantage to any individual unless it also gives a
substantive disadvantage to some other individual. In other words, one cannot
pay Paul without robbing Peter.
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Lemma 4.2. Suppose the gain functions Jˆi(γt) are concave, monotone and do
not saturate2 and satisfy Jˆi(γt) > −∞ for positive cashflows γt . Suppose that
Jˆi(γt) = −∞ whenever γt is negative on a set of finite measure.
Let i∗ be an individual, then for any ǫ1 > 0 there exists ǫ2 > 0 such that
for any admissible investment consumption strategy for all the investors with γi
satisfying
Jˆi∗(γ
i∗
t ) ≥ vˆi∗ + ǫ1 (4.2)
there is an investor i such that
Jˆi(γ
i
t) ≤ vˆi − ǫ2.
Proof. Let us write vi(b) for the value function for individual i as a function of
their budget b. By Lemma (4.3) below, vi is continuous as a function of b for
any b > 0. We write Bi for the budget of individual i.
In a complete market, we call a measurable non-negative cashflow γt a deriva-
tives contract and we call the discounted Q-measure expectation of γt the price
of this contract. This price may be infinite, which means that the cashflows can-
not be super-replicated by any admissible trading strategy. If the price is finite,
the contract can be replicated by an admissible trading strategy with initial
budget given by the price. Note that the requirement that γt is non-negative
ensures that the price of derivative contracts is additive: if negative infinities
were allowed as prices this would not be the case.
If we write Db for the set of derivatives contracts of price less than or equal
to b, we have:
vˆi(b) = sup
γ∈Db
Jˆ (γ).
Here we have used our assumption that negative cashflows yield a value of −∞
for the gain function.
By the continuity of vi∗ , there is a price, δ, such that if Jˆi∗(γ
i∗
t ) ≥ vi∗ + ǫ1,
then the price of the derivative contract with payoff γi∗t is at least Bi∗ + δ.
By the monotonicity and non-saturation of the gain functions, together with
the concavity given by Lemma (4.3) below
vˆi
(
Bi −
δ
ℓ− 1
)
< vˆi(Bi).
Let
ǫ2 = inf
i6=i∗
{
vˆi(Bi)− vˆi
(
Bi −
δ
2(ℓ− 1)
)}
.
Any derivative contract with cashflows γi satisfying
Jˆi(γ
i
t) ≤ vˆi − ǫ2.
2The definitions of these terms were given for gain functions over cashflows with mortality,
but the corresponding definitions for Jˆ should be obvious
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will cost at least Bi −
δ
2(ℓ−1) . Hence the total cost of an investment strategy
yielding all the cashflows γi is at least
Bi + δ +
∑
i6=i∗
(
Bi −
δ
2(ℓ− 1)
)
=
∑
i
Bi +
δ
2
which is greater than the total budget and hence cannot be admissible.
Lemma 4.3. Consider investment without mortality in a homogeneous market.
Suppose an individual’s gain function over consumption, Jˆ (γ), is concave and
monotone. Let Ab be the set of admissible consumption, investment strategies
with initial budget b. Define
vˆ(b) = sup
(γ,α)∈Ab
Jˆi(γ).
The function v is concave and hence v is continuous on any open set on which
it is finite.
Proof. Given two budgets b1, b2 > b then let (γi, αi) be admissible strategies
for each budget. So for any λ ∈ [0, 1], (λγ1 + (1 − λ)γ2, λα1 + (1 − λ)α2) is an
admissible strategy with budget λb1 + (1− λ)b2. By the concavity of Jˆ ,
Jˆ (λγ1 + (1 − λ)γ2) ≥ λJˆ (γ1) + (1− λ)Jˆ (γ2).
Hence
vˆ(λb1 + (1− λ)b2) ≥ λvˆ(b1) + (1 − λ)vˆ(b2).
Remark 4.4. Lemma 4.2 is only true in complete markets. If two individuals
have different risk or consumption preferences in an incomplete market then it
can often be beneficial to design a derivatives contract to the mutual advantage of
both parties. This is the essential purpose of derivatives contracts and explains
why there is a market for such contracts.
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.5. For any acceptable management scheme in a complete market
aM(ω,∞, ζ) = v(∞, ζ)
so long as all individual gain functions are concave, monotone, invariant and
do no saturate, and so long as
lim
n→∞
v(n, ζ) = v(∞, ζ) > −∞. (4.3)
for any positive budget.
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Proof. We will prove the result in the case of discrete time consumption. The
case of continuous time consumption is similar.
By Axiom I3, limn→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ limn→∞ v(nωζ , ζ). By assumption
limn→∞ v(n, ζ) = v(∞, ζ). Hence a(ω,∞, ζ) = limn→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ v(∞, ζ).
Let us now define the meaning of an admissible strategy for an infinite het-
erogeneous collective where the types of each individual are given by the pro-
portions ω. We will assume that surviving individuals of a given type, ζ, all
consume γζt at time t. Hence the total consumption per person (i.e. of any type,
including both survivors and the deceased) is∑
ζ∈Z
γ
ζ
t π
ζ
t ω
ζ
where πζt denotes the proportion of individuals of type ζ who survive to time t.
Note that πζt = 1− Fτζ (t) where τζ is a random variable distributed according
to the time-of-death distribution for individuals of type ζ.
If we let Yt denote the fund value per person before consumption and Y t
denote the fund value per person after consumption we have the following bud-
get equations for the dynamics of Yt and Y t. Let us write B
ζ for the initial
budget of individuals of type ζ. Then the fund value per person for the infinite
heterogenous collective should be defined to follow the dynamics
Yt =


∑
ζ∈Z ω
ζBζ t = 0
limh→0+ Y t−h t ∈ T \ {0}
Y t otherwise.
Y t =
{
Yt −
∑
ζ∈Z γ
ζ
t π
ζ
t ω
ζ t ∈ T
Y t′ +
∑k
i=1
∫ t
t′
αisY s dS
i
s t
′ ∈ T and t′ ≤ t < t′ + δt.
(4.4)
We may alternatively view the equations above as describing the dynamics
of a fund of “virtual individuals” where each virtual individual represents the
interests of an infinite fund of individuals all of type ζ. To see this, we define
γˆ
ζ
t = γ
ζ
t π
ζ
t ω
ζ . We say that virtual individual ζ consumes an amount γˆζt at each
time t ∈ T . We say that the initial budget of virtual individual ζ is ωζBζ . We
may now view equation (4.4) as giving the dynamics of the total fund value
before consumption Yt of a collective of these heterogeneous virtual individuals.
This observation will allow us to apply Lemma 4.2 to the collective investment
problem with mortality.
Let us define a gain function (without mortality) Jˆζ for the virtual individual
ζ by
Jˆζ(γˆ
ζ
t ) := Jζ(γ
ζ
t , τζ)
Let us write vˆζ(b) for the value function of a virtual individual with this gain
function with an initial budget b. We see that vˆζ(ω
ζBζ) = v(∞, ζ).
Suppose (γ,α) is a strategy for the infinite heterogeneous collective and let
ζ∗ be a chosen type of individual. It follows by Lemma 4.2 that for any given
ǫ1 > 0 such that
Jˆζ∗(γˆ
ζ∗
t ) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + ǫ1 (4.5)
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there exists ǫ2 > 0 and a type ζ such that
Jˆζ(γˆ
ζ
t ) ≤ v(∞, ζ)− ǫ2. (4.6)
Hence given any ǫ1 > 0 such that
Jζ∗(γ
ζ∗
t , τζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + ǫ1 (4.7)
there exists ǫ2 > 0 and a type ζ such that
Jζ(γ
ζ
t , τζ) ≤ v(∞, ζ) − ǫ2. (4.8)
Now let us suppose for a contradiction that for some ǫ1 > 0, ζ∗ andN we have
a(ω,N, ζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗)+2ǫ1. Note that we then have a(ω, n, ζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗)+2ǫ1
for all n ≥ N . We may then choose ǫ2 > 0 as described in the preceding
paragraph.
There are only finitely many types ζ and we know limn→∞ aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥
v(∞, ζ). So for sufficiently large n we may assume that
aM(ω, n, ζ) ≥ v(∞, ζ)−
1
3ǫ2.
Hence for such n we may find an investment-consumption strategy (γ,α) for a
collective of n individuals which yields the same consumption for all surviving
individuals of a given type and which satisfies
Jζ∗(γ
ζ∗
t , τζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + ǫ1
and which also satisfies
Jζ(γ
ζ
t ,ζ ) ≥ v(∞, ζ) −
2
3ǫ2
for all types ζ.
Since the discounted asset prices Sit are Q-martingales we have
EQ×PL

∑
ζ∈Z
∫
e−rtωζγ
ζ
t dT (t)

 ≤∑
ζ∈Z
ωζBζ .
Since the consumption γt is non-negative we have by Fubini’s theorem that
γ
ζ
t := EPL
(∫
e−rtωζγ
ζ
t dT (t) | St
)
is a progressivelymeasurable process for the filtered probability space (ΩM ,Ft,PM )
and satisfies ∑
ζ∈Z
EQ
(∫
e−rtωζγ
ζ
t dT (t)
)
≤
∑
ζ∈Z
ωζBζ .
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By the complete market assumption we can then find an investment strategy α
that funds γ. Hence we have found an admissible strategy (γ,α) for the infinite
homogeneous collective which by the concavity of the preferences will satisfy
Jζ∗(γ
ζ∗
t , τζ∗) ≥ v(∞, ζ∗) + ǫ1
and which also satisfies
Jζ(γ
ζ
t ,ζ ) ≥ v(∞, ζ) −
2
3ǫ2
for all types ζ. This contradicts equations (4.7) and (4.8).
We deduce that a(ω,N, ζ) ≤ v(∞, ζ) for all ζ, which gives the result.
The financial significance of Theorem 4.5 is that all acceptable strategies are
asymptotically equivalent in a complete market, in particular this applies to the
Black–Scholes–Merton market.
The result is analogous to the classical result that in the Black–Scholes–
Merton market any derivative has a unique price independent of the preferences
of the investor. This too is an asymptotic result, in the sense that it assumes
continuous time and zero transaction costs.
In practice no two individuals are alike, and so our assumption of a finite
number of distinct types can be criticised. However, simple modifications of
our strategy for heterogeneous funds will yield good results if there are a large
number of similar individuals. We give a concrete algorithm in [4] and show
that it achieves approximately 98% of the maximum benefit of collectivisation
for a heterogeneous fund of only 100 investors.
Remark 4.6. It is natural to ask how our results extend if one incorporates
systematic longevity risk. The simplest approach would be to assume that there
is a complete market of contracts on the risk factors determining systematic
longevity risk, in which case a similar result can be expected to hold. Longevity
derivatives do exist, but at present the market is not very liquid. Our results
suggest that each type of individual will have different views on the attractiveness
of longevity risk, which would imply that the development of collective funds
should result in a more liquid market in longevity derivatives.
A Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Recall that when working with Epstein–Zin preferences
we assume Ω⊥ is trivial.
To prove the existence of Epstein–Zin utility with mortality following the
methods of [18] one first makes the change of variables (V˜t, Z˜t, ζ˜t) = αe
− bαt
ρ (VT , Zt, ζt)
to transform 1.2 to the BSDE
dV˜t = F (t, γt, V˜t)1t≤τ dt− Z˜t dWt −
n∑
i=1
ζ˜it dM
i
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; V˜T = e
− bTα
ρ αU
(A.1)
21
where
F (t, γt, v) :=
bα exp(−bt)
ρ
γ
ρ
t v
1− ρ
α .
To prove the existence and uniqueness of this BSDE, one next solves the family
of BSDEs indexed by m ∈ R≥0,
dV˜ mt = F
m(t, γt, V˜
m
t )1t≤τ dt−Z˜t dWt−
n∑
i=1
ζ˜it dM
i
t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T ; V˜T = e
− bTα
ρ αU
(A.2)
where
Fm(t, γt, v) := b
α
ρ
exp(−bt)(γρt ∧m)(v ∧m)
1− ρ
α .
The driver Fm has the property that y → Fm(t, γt, y) is Lipschitz (since our
parameter assumptions ensure 1 − ρ
α
> 1) and so one can use the theory of
[12] to obtain the existence of a unique solution to this BSDE. The comparison
theorem ensures that V˜ m is non-negative and decreasing in m. The proof of
Proposition 2.2 in [18] then shows that the V˜ = limm→∞ V˜
m can be extended
to give a solution to (A.1).
Let us define EZm(γ, τ) := 1
α
V˜m0 . We have that EZ
m(γ, τ) is finite, non-
positive and increasing in m with limit given by the Epstein–Zin utility with
mortality which we denote EZ(γ, τ).
Let M < v∞ and ǫ > 0 be given. We may find an admissible consumption
stream γ∞t for the problem of an infinite collective with initial budget B such
that EZ(γ∞t , τ
ι) ≥M .
Since EZ is concave and finite, for any admissible γ, the map λ→ EZ(λγ∞t , τ
ι)
is continuous on R≥0. Hence we may choose λ ∈ (0, 1) such that EZ(λγ∞t , τ
ι) ≥
M − ǫ. By the convergence of EZm in m, we may then find m such that
EZm(λγ∞t , τ
ι) ≥M − 2ǫ. (A.3)
Suppose that we have an initial budget of B for the problem of a collective
of n investors. Recall that nt denotes the number of survivors at time t. Let
Gn,t be the event defined by
Gn,t = {ω | ns(ω) ≤
1
λ
E(ns)∀0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
We write ¬Gn,t for its compliment. The consumption stream λ1Gn,tγ
∞
t will be
admissible, as the consumption per survivor will always be less than γt.
Define Fm,∞(t, v) := Fm(t, λγ∞t , v) and F
m,n(t, v) := Fm(t, λ1Gn,tγ
∞
t , v)
for finite n. Write (V˜ m,n, Z˜m,n, ζ˜m,n) for the solution to (A.2) for the driver
Fm,n for both finite and infinite values of n, and define EZm,n := 1
α
V˜ m,n
Differentiating the expression for Fm,n(t, v) with respect to v, we obtain the
following Lipschitz estimate for the drivers
|Fm,n(t, y1)− F
m,n(t, y2)| ≤
(
1−
ρ
α
)
b
|α|
ρ
m1−
ρ
α |y1 − y2| =: Cm|y1 − y2|
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for an appropriately defined constant Cm.
Let us define e = |V˜ m,∞ − V˜ m,n|. By Proposition 2.4 of [12], we obtain the
following bound on e:
e2 ≤ ηmE[
∫ T
0
eβms|Fm,∞(s, V˜ m,∞)− Fm,n(s, V˜ m,n)|2 ds],
where ηm :=
1
C2m
and βm := 3C
2
m + 2Cm. Inserting the definitions of F
m,n we
obtain
e2 ≤ ηmE[
∫ T
0
bα
ρ
eβms((λ1¬Gn,sγ
∞
s )
ρ ∧m)(V˜ m,∞ ∧m)1−
ρ
α ds.
Splitting the integral into two regions, we find that for δ ∈ (0, T ),
e2 ≤ ηm
bαm2−
ρ
α
ρ
eβmTE[
∫ T−δ
0
1¬Gn,s ds+
∫ T
T−δ
ds]
≤ ηm
bαm2−
ρ
α
ρ
eβmTE[
∫ T−δ
0
1¬Gn,T−δ ds+ δ] as ¬Gn,s ⊆ ¬Gn,t if s ≤ t
≤ C˜m(TP(¬Gn,T−δ) + δ) (A.4)
for an appropriately defined Cm. Choose δ such that C˜mδ ≤
1
2α
2ǫ2. Now use
the fact that P (¬Gn,T−δ)→ 0 as n→ ∞ (as follows readily from Lemma A.1,
below) to choose n such that C˜m(TP(¬Gn,T−δ) ≤
1
2α
2ǫ2. By (A.4) we will then
have that e ≤ |α|ǫ. We then have
vn ≥ EZ(λ1Gn,tγ
∞
t ) ≥ |EZ
m,n| ≥ |EZm,∞| −
e
|α|
≥ |EZm,∞| − ǫ ≥M − 3ǫ.
where we have used in sequence: the definition of vn; the convergence of the
increasing sequence in m given by EZm,n; the definitions of e and EZm,n; our
bound for e; equation (A.3). So by Theorem 3.1, limn→∞ vn = v∞.
We now prove the Lemma used in the proof.
Lemma A.1. Let T ∗ be minimum time by which an individual is almost sure
to have died. For a continuous mortality distribution, given a time point 0 ≤
t0 < T
∗, for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a finite set of points ti ∈ [0, t0), indexed
by i ∈ I such that
P
(
∀t ∈ [0, t0] : nt ≤
(
1
1− ǫ
)2
E(nt)
)
≥ P
(
∀i ∈ I : nti ≤
(
1
1− ǫ
)
E(nti)
)
.
Proof. We define ti inductively. If ti−1 = 0, we are done and take the index set
I = {0, 1, . . . , i− 1}. Otherwise define
ti = inf
{
t | t = 0 or E(nt) ≤
1
1− ǫ
E(nti−1)
}
.
23
If ti 6= 0 we see E(nti−1 ) ≥
1
1−ǫE(nti), so for sufficiently large i we must have
ti = 0. Hence the index set, I, is finite.
Given t ∈ [0, t0] we can find i ∈ I with ti ≤ t ≤ ti−1. Suppose
nt >
(
1
1− ǫ
)2
E(nt)
then we have
nt >
(
1
1− ǫ
)2
E(nti) ≥
(
1
1− ǫ
)2
E(nti−1) ≥
(
1
1− ǫ
)
E(nt).
References
[1] John Armstrong. Classifying markets up to isomorphism. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.03546, 2018.
[2] John Armstrong and Cristin Buescu. Collectivised pension invest-
ment with exponential Kihlstrom–Mirman preferences. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1911.02296, 2019.
[3] John Armstrong and Cristin Buescu. Collectivised pension investment with
homogeneous Epstein–Zin preferences. arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.10047,
2019.
[4] John Armstrong and Cristin Buescu. Collectivised post-retirement invest-
ment. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.12730, 2019.
[5] Joshua Aurand and Yu-Jui Huang. Epstein-Zin utility maximization on
random horizons. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.08782, 2019.
[6] Ravi Bansal. Long-run risks and financial markets. Technical report, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA, 2007.
[7] Ravi Bansal and Amir Yaron. Risks for the long run: A potential resolution
of asset pricing puzzles. The Journal of Finance, 59(4):1481–1509, 2004.
[8] Luca Benzoni, Pierre Collin-Dufresne, and Robert S Goldstein. Explaining
asset pricing puzzles associated with the 1987 market crash. Journal of
Financial Economics, 101(3):552–573, 2011.
[9] Harjoat S Bhamra, Lars-Alexander Kuehn, and Ilya A Strebulaev. The
levered equity risk premium and credit spreads: A unified framework. The
Review of Financial Studies, 23(2):645–703, 2009.
[10] John Y Campbell and Luis M Viceira. Consumption and portfolio deci-
sions when expected returns are time varying. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114(2):433–495, 1999.
24
[11] Darrell Duffie and Larry G Epstein. Stochastic differential utility. Econo-
metrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 353–394, 1992.
[12] Roxana Dumitrescu, Miryana Grigorova, Marie-Claire Quenez, and Agne`s
Sulem. BSDEs with default jump. In The Abel Symposium, pages 233–263.
Springer, 2016.
[13] Larry G. Epstein and Stanley E. Zin. Substitution, risk aversion, and
the temporal behavior of consumption and asset returns: A theoretical
framework. Econometrica, 57(4):937–969, 1989.
[14] Monique Jeanblanc, Marc Yor, and Marc Chesney. Mathematical methods
for financial markets. Springer Science & Business Media, 2009.
[15] David M Kreps and Evan L Porteus. Temporal resolution of uncertainty
and dynamic choice theory. Econometrica, pages 185–200, 1978.
[16] Robert C Merton. Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: The
continuous-time case. The Review of Economics and Statistics, pages 247–
257, 1969.
[17] John Rawls. A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971.
[18] Hao Xing. Consumption–investment optimization with Epstein–Zin utility
in incomplete markets. Finance and Stochastics, 21(1):227–262, 2017.
25
